Facts and Opinions, Facts and Values, and Expertise
A problem in schools
It may be that I am misunderstanding, but I have the impression that schools today seem to teach elementary and middle school students not only that there is a distinction between facts and opinions but that the two are mutually exclusive and that moral and aesthetic questions can only have answers that are entirely opinions. Students seem to be taught that there are no moral or aesthetic facts. Frankly, it’s not clear to me what is taught as being entirely matters of fact. Some basic math and physical science may be all there is on that side of the divide, if the young students I speak to are an accurate gauge. Somehow, which foods are more nutritious than which seems to (somehow) be a matter of opinion in their minds. I may be wrong about most of this, but thought it worth considering.
There are, of course, multiple areas of inquiry, and one might reasonably think some are only receptive to opinions and not facts. Surely, though, others include facts—basic mathematics, for one obvious example. Importantly, there are some areas of inquiry that include facts that only experts know. Advanced or theoretical mathematics, for examples. Many seem to be taught that there are very few such areas of inquiry. They seem to think that even in areas of inquiry about theoretical physics, for example, there are only opinions. If I’m right that this is what children are being taught, I think it’s problematic.
The problem, I think, may be caused by a failure to recognize a different distinction: the distinction between facts and values. When teachers (or anyone) insist that in an area of inquiry there are only opinions, they may fail to realize that they are working within a value system that entails something like an epistemological egalitarianism—a system wherein no individual’s opinion is more valuable than anyone else’s—at least for that area of inquiry.
To start with that sort of egalitarianism of belief is to assume—not prove—that there are no facts in those areas. If you believe there are facts in any given area of enquiry, you have to reject the epistemological egalitarian view (at least for that area) because you accept that some beliefs or opinions do not correspond to the facts. That means some beliefs about that area of inquiry are better—worth more—than others. (This should be obvious: at least sometimes we go to medical doctors because we don’t know how to get better and they do.) If, by contrast, you assume there are no facts in an area of inquiry—perhaps because of an undefended claim of a fact (or metafact, if you prefer) that all opinions about that area are equal—you are left with the view that there are only mere opinions in that area. Valuing all opinions equally means denying some are right (correspond to facts) and some are not.
If you assume that everyone who cares to weigh in about the ultimate foundation of physical existence is equally entitled to do so and that their views are of equal value, you quickly conclude that there are only opinions about that field (whether you think that field is theoretical physics, philosophical metaphysics, or something else). If you assume that everyone who cares to weigh in about a moral question is equally entitled to do so and that their views are of equal value, you quickly conclude that there are only opinions about the question. This, I think, is a mistake.
Perhaps it’s true that everyone is entitled to their own opinions about any area of inquiry (perhaps even about whether 5 plus 2 equals 7), but that does not mean their views are of equal value.
To be clear, I agree that everyone is entitled to their own opinions—really about anything at all. I would simply add that unless they have some genuine expertise in the relevant area, their opinion is worth less than that of those who do. Anyone is entitled to believe that one diet is better than another, but unless they have some genuine expertise, their opinion is worth less than that of medical doctors, nurses, and nutritionists. Anyone is entitled to believe that state-controlled communism is better than a market economy with government supports in the background (what we have in the US), but without serious training in economics, their opinion is worth less than that of experts with phds in economics.
As important as that last point is, it’s just as important to make clear that those with expertise have opinions just like the rest of us. They have opinions about all sorts of things including things they are not experts about (they might think their views about these things are privileged too, but that’s their mistake). What matters here is that they have opinions about the things they are experts about. Medical doctors have opinions about what foods are better to eat than others, for example. It’s not wrong to say they have opinions about their fields; it is wrong to say they have mere opinions. As experts, their opinions (about their fields of inquiry) are more than that—more valuable than the opinions of non-experts.
It’s not a mere opinion that the earth goes around the sun, but it is an opinion. It’s an opinion, thankfully, most of us share. It’s not a mere opinion that the earth is spherical, but it is an opinion. Again, it’s an opinion most of us share. (Yes, flat-earthers are “entitled to their opinion.” No, that doesn’t entail it is as valuable as the correct opinion.)
To relate this to my last post: if you deny that expert’s opinions are more valuable in their area of expertise than those of the rest of us, don’t expect others to listen to what you say. Why would they after you’ve claimed there are no experts? You’ve said there are no such things as better or worse (more or less accurate) opinions; they may as well just go with what they already have and ignore experts and non-experts alike—including you.
A caveat: that someone is not an expert about something does not mean we—or the experts in the field—should never listen to them. Non-experts are, as I’ve already agreed, entitled to their own opinions, even non-reasonable opinions. More than that, though, experts should at least sometimes be willing to hear non-expert opinions as they might bring fresh insights, challenge us to rethink assumptions that need challenging, etc. Still, if you deny there are any experts—i.e., if you deny that expert opinions are more valuable in their field than the opinions of the rest of us—you shouldn’t expect anyone to take you seriously. Of course, you’d presumably not care about that. If you think your novice contribution to a field is as valuable as anyone’s—that is, if you accept epistemological egalitarianism—its not clear why you’d want to share your view with people others call “experts.” You, of course, don’t recognize their view as of any particular value.